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Biological Terrorism
The nature of terrorism is changing. It is no longer
only hijackers and bombs. Nor is it only chemical
attacks, such as the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo Sarin gas
attack in the Tokyo subway. With recent events in Iraq
and elsewhere making headlines, biological agents have
joined more traditional methods in the public awareness. Similar to chemical terrorism in some ways,
bioterrorism differs primarily in the lag time between
the terrorist event and its medical consequences. It
therefore poses its own critical challenges, particularly
for the public health community. Chief among these is
assessing just how great a threat is posed by particular
agents and improving the nation’s surveillance and
response capabilities.
To assist in assessing the risk, the Senate Veterans
Affairs Committee and other committees have asked the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to gather information on the “science behind the threat.”1 Defining the
threat is particularly problematic and raises many
questions: How available are biological agents? How
easy would it be for terrorists to “weaponize” and use
them? Are biological agents becoming the weapons of
choice for terrorists? Given limited dollars, how and
where and on which specific agents should preparedness experts focus their efforts and resources? While
some experts disagree about the precise probability of
a specific bioterrorist event, others stress that even lowprobability events with high-consequence outcomes
demand careful attention and planning. Even accidental
exposures to biological agents and hoaxes, such as the
recent California anthrax pranks, have critical implications for preparedness.
Successful preparation will depend upon the
development of a well-orchestrated plan to be used by
the civilian personnel first responding to an event.
First responders will vary, depending upon the nature
of the attack. For biological terrorism, they will be
epidemiologists, infections disease experts, emergency
room personnel, and critical care unit personnel. These
are the persons who are most likely to discover and
need to respond initially to acts of bioterrorism because serious attacks with bioweapons would presumably cause epidemics. The traditional first responder
community for chemical or explosive events—fire,
police, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams, and
emergency medical technicians—would be complementary but not central to the management of an
epidemic caused by bioweapons.

Given the extreme importance attached to the
readiness of civilian medical first responders and the
growing appreciation for the likelihood of a biological
terrorist event to occur in the United States, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of
Emergency Preparedness (OEP) asked the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) in conjunction with the National
Academy of Sciences’ Commission on Life Sciences to:





Collect and assess existing research, development, and
technology information on detecting potential chemical and biological agents and protecting and treating
both the targets of attack and health care providers.
Provide specific recommendations for priority
research and development.

The IOM report, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian
Medical Response,
identifies more than 60 research and development
projects potentially useful in minimizing damage
caused by a terrorist attack, including new drugs and
vaccines, faster and easier-to-use chemical detectors
and diagnostic tests, and communications software to
improve disease surveillance and provide information
about possible attacks. The report also discusses steps
that could be taken to improve the capabilities of
public health departments, poison control centers and
metropolitan police departments.

(See Table 1-1 at the end of the issue brief.)
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This Forum session will use the IOM’s study as a
springboard for understanding the role the health care
community must play in the event of a domestic biological terrorist attack. Speakers—focusing primarily on
bioterrorism, as opposed to chemical2 or radiological
terrorism—will highlight the issue of threat assessment
and discuss ways to improve the current level of preparedness as well as steps needed to convert the public
health system into our best form of civil defense.

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 101
The use of microorganisms and toxins as weapons of
destruction has a long history, with examples of biological terrorism dating back to before the 14th century.
Methods used have ranged from deliberately infecting
water supplies with diseased cadavers to passing out
smallpox-infected blankets to “extirpate” Native American tribes in 1763.3 Other examples include the use of
fomites (objects that harbor and can transmit disease
agents), as the Viet Cong did in the early 1960s when
they smeared pungi sticks with excrement.4
Diseases resulting from biological agents, whether
spread person-to-person or through other means, have
incubation periods of days. This means, for example,
that a person infected in a mass casualty attack could
unwittingly continue to spread the disease, perhaps
unleashing a deadly epidemic and most likely causing
a wave of panic as the death toll mounted. Terrorists
count on this added psychological dimension to erode
trust in the target country’s government and further
cripple efforts at containment and control.
Biological agents considered to be priority biological terrorism threats can be categorized into three
groups: bacteria, viruses, and toxins. In a March 8,
1998, New York Times article, Tom Kuntz excerpted the
following from Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook, a “guide
for military, police, and emergency personnel responding to suspected or real chemical or germ attacks.”
Anthrax. Anthrax is an acute bacterial infection of the
skin, lungs, or gastrointestinal tract. The skin infection
can be caused by direct contact with contaminated wool,
hides or [livestock] tissues. . . . As a biological weapon,
it is expected that anthrax spores would be released at a
strategic location to be inhaled. Inhalation anthrax
results from deposition of the bacterial spores in the
lungs and causes fever, shock, and eventually death. . ..
Iraqi and Soviet biological warfare programs worked to
develop an anthrax weapon.
Ricin. Ricin is a toxin made from the mash left over
after processing castor beans for oil. Castor bean
processing is a worldwide activity; therefore, the raw

materials for making ricin are easily available. Ricin
is easy to produce and is stable. Ricin was used in
1978 by Bulgarian intelligence operatives in the
“umbrella murder” of Gregori Markov, a Bulgarian
dissident. A ricin-tipped bullet was discharged into
the victim, and he died a day after the attack.
Ebola. Ebola virus is one of the most pathogenic
viruses known to science, causing death in 50 to 90
percent of all clinically ill cases. . . . The Ebola virus
is transmitted through direct contact with the blood,
secretions, organs, or semen of infected persons.
Transmission of the virus has also occurred by handling ill or infected chimpanzees. The virus has an
incubation period of 2 to 21 days, and is characterized
by sudden onset of fever, weakness, muscle pain,
headache and sore throat. This is followed by vomiting, diarrhea, rash, limited kidney and liver functions
and both internal and external bleeding. . . . Ebola
viruses must be considered to have a high priority as
a candidate for biological warfare. . . . This virus was
assigned high priority in the former offensive program
of the Soviet Union.

Additional biologic agents potentially available to
bioterrorists include smallpox, brucellosis, plague, Q
fever, tularemia, viral encephalitides, viral hemmorrhagic fevers, botulinum, and staphylococcal enterotoxin B.

DETECTING BIOLOGIC AGENTS:
THE ROLE OF THE CDC AND STATE
HEALTH DEPARTMENTS
Detecting and isolating biologic agents requires not
only the ability of clinicians to identify and accurately
diagnose uncommon diseases but also a surveillance
system for collecting reports of such cases. Fortunately,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
operate a large number of infectious disease surveillance
systems based on voluntary collaboration with state and
local health departments, surveys, vital records, or
registries. Unfortunately, the IOM report noted:
The best known of these systems, the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System, currently includes
several, but not all, of the diseases considered likely
to be used in bioterrorism, and, like all passive surveillance systems, suffers from omissions and longdelayed reports. All of the systems depend upon
confirmed diagnosis and are thus no help to a puzzled
physician trying to arrive at a diagnosis. No federal
funds are provided to state and local health departments to support these systems, and states’ ability or
willingness to support infectious disease surveillance
has declined in recent years. CDC’s Emerging Infections Program (EIP) is attempting to reverse this trend
by making grants to state and local health departments

4
for improving epidemiological and laboratory capability. Expanding the activities of these centers would be
an excellent way to raise both the awareness of
bioterrorism and the ability to respond to it.

Bioterrorism: A Possible Scenario
In his testimony on June 2, 1998, before the Senate
Committee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education’s Subcommittee on Appropriations, Edward
Thompson, M.D., the health commissioner for the State
of Mississippi, explained:
The likely scenario that a few major cities have either
already tested, or are planning to test, in a table top
exercise unfolds as follows: A bioterrorist event
occurs involving the unannounced release of anthrax
spores in an open air location during a major public
event. The first responsibility immediately falls to the
local health department to detect that an unusual
number and type of case reporting is occurring.
Responsibility for diagnosis of the agent falls next to
the local or state public health laboratory. Investigation, by interviewing victims, again is the responsibility of the local health department, with assistance
from the state health department, in order to identify
the source of the agent, when the release took place,
and who might have been exposed. Other critical
phases of the exercise where major responsibility falls
to the local health department, with assistance from
the state health department, involves the distribution
of vaccine and other essential treatment resources and
distribution of diseased victims around the state and
region as thousands become symptomatic.

In his testimony, Thompson stated,
Essential state health department functions in preparing for and responding to a bioterrorist incident would
involve the following activities: epidemiologic surveillance, laboratory analysis, epidemiologic investigation, information and communications systems, and
coordination of essential equipment and treatment
(including health care facilities and personnel, isolation beds, and the availability and distribution of
vaccines and other necessary treatment resources).

Experts all agree that states are ill-prepared to
respond to a bioterrorist event. To underscore the
current lack of preparedness among state health departments, Thompson quoted from a draft document on
catastrophic disaster and terrorism by the Illinois
Department of Health:
The Department is mandated to protect the public
health and safety of the citizens of Illinois. However,
limited opportunities have been made available to
adequately prepare staff for a response to a terrorist
incident involving radiological, biological, or chemical materials. Therefore, the Department’s response

capabilities are currently limited. Several factors have
prevented the Department from attaining a higher
level of preparedness. These factors include: absence
of a consistent funding source for training and education programs; limited personnel in infectious diseases, environmental health and laboratory services
programs; and a lack of Federal guidance and information on source standards and detection methods.

Local and state health departments cannot fight
terrorism alone. Emergency medical personnel as well as
hospital personnel will also play a vital role in responding
to biological and chemical incidents and reducing their
consequences. In an effort to improve the preparedness of
medical civilian responders, Congress in 1996 established
the Domestic Preparedness Program, or DPP, under the
Department of Defense. DPP, also referred to as the
Nunn-Luger-Domenici program, appropriated funds to
help train local first responders. Estimates indicate that
approximately $92 million has been appropriated in fiscal
years 1997 and 1998 to enable the U.S. Army to deliver
special “train the trainer” tutoring programs, to conduct
exercises to test what has been learned, and to assist in the
creation of medical strike teams in some of the largest
American cities.

CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE:
MANAGING TERRORIST ATTACKS
According to the September 1997 GAO report
Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to
Implement National Policy and Strategy:
U.S. policy on combating terrorism has been evolving
for about 25 years. In June 1995, the President issued
Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39), “United
States Policy on Counterterrorism,” the central blueprint for the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. PDD 39
restated standing U.S. policy and elaborated a strategy
for combating terrorism and measures to implement it.
The U.S. strategy consists of three main elements: (1)
reduce vulnerabilities and prevent and deter terrorist
acts before they occur; (2) respond to terrorist acts
that do occur, including managing crises and apprehending and punishing terrorist perpetrators; and (3)
manage the consequences of terrorist attacks.

More recently, in May 1998, PDD 62 (“Combating
Terrorism”) and PDD 63 (“Critical Infrastructure Protection”) were both issued. These directives establish a
national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection,
and counterterrorism and authorize the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to set up a National Infrastructure
Protection Center to issue warnings to public and private
operators of essential elements of the U.S. government
and economy. In addition, the directives include a four-
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biological agent is not beyond current medical capabilities. However, large numbers of casualties will
quickly overtax those capabilities. Vaccines, drugs,
antitoxins, and supportive medical equipment are
generally available in small quantities. Moreover,
many of the vaccines and antitoxins are not FDA
[Food and Drug Administration] approved and are
only available as Investigational New Drugs (INDs).
This means not only that the product is only available
in limited amounts, but that it can be used only in a
research setting with the informed consent of the
recipient. Thus, IND status effectively precludes use
in a mass-casualty situation.

part initiative focused on biological weapons. According
to the IOM report,
It calls for a national surveillance system based on the
public health system, provision of local authorities with
necessary equipment and training, stockpiles of vaccines
and specialized medicines, and a research and development program on pathogen gene mapping to guide
development of new and better medicines and vaccines.

Preparing to meet the needs of civilian victims of a
bioterrorist attack will require the coordination of the
health care community as a whole, as well as of many
other organizations, experts, and agencies at all levels
of government. It has been estimated that more than 40
federal departments, agencies, and bureaus have some
role in combating terrorism. Part of the challenge, not
surprisingly, involves working through the complex
maze of multiple bureaucracies to figure out who does
what when and who reports to whom.
Generally, if an incident occurs without a warning,
crisis and consequence management will be concurrent.
The FBI would be in charge of crisis management (that
is, controlling the crime scene and gathering evidence
used to prosecute the terrorists). Primary responsibility
for consequence management, however, rests with the
states. The federal government supports state and local
governments in domestic incidents through the Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
coordinates the federal response through a generic
disaster contingency plan known as the Federal Response Plan, which categorizes types of federal assistance into specific emergency support functions.
Support functions include, for example, health and
medical services, urban search and rescue, and information and planning.

Policy Dilemmas
In addition to organizational and chain-of-command
issues, other policy quagmires need to be sorted out.
For example, as Sean Paige wrote in his January 26,
1998, Insight cover story, “At the Eleventh Hour,”
Often the government seems to be working at crosspurposes—certain pieces of lifesaving protective gear
much in demand by first responders across the country
are off-limits to them because they don’t meet
workplace-safety standards. Yet these same items
often are widely used by the military or approved for
use in foreign countries.

The IOM draft report noted a similar dilemma.
With a few exceptions, treatment of a very small
number of individuals exposed to any chemical or

The final IOM report added the following:
FDA recognized the difficulty IND status presented in
potential mass-casualty situations during the Persian
Gulf War and passed an interim rule waiving the
requirement for the United States military to obtain
informed consent in using two investigational products intended to provide protection against chemical
and biological warfare agents. The FDA has recently
solicited comments on the wisdom of revoking this
interim rule as well as on the nature of the evidence
that ought to be required when products cannot
ethically be tested in humans.

PAYING FOR PREPAREDNESS
Increasing the level of preparedness is not cheap. In
addition to funds appropriated more generally to counterterrorism efforts, Congress appropriated funds for
bioterrorism and related public health infrastructure
activities within DHHS. Specifically, the Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY99 allocated $216,922,000 to the Public
Health and Social Services Emergency Fund. According
to the conference report, “The fund addresses the Administration request for bioterrorism and related activities as
well as for bolstering public health infrastructure, conducting studies regarding health and national security, and
combating certain infections diseases.”
According to the conference report, the $216,922,000
is to be allocated as follows:



$154,750,000 for the CDC for a variety of activities.
These include: $1 million for the development of an
overall preparedness plan, $1 million to enhance
technical capabilities to identify certain biological
agents, $51 million5 for the CDC to establish a
pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpile for civilian
populations,6 $1.75 million for conducting independent studies of health and bioterrorism threats
specified in the Senate report, $2 million to assist
states in developing emergency preparedness and
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response plans, $2 million to expand the CDC
Epidemic Intelligence Service, $2 million for regional laboratories for measuring chemical exposures, $5 million to better identify potential biological and chemical terrorism agents, $5 million to
develop new sources and methods for surveillance,
$5 million to develop rapid toxic screening, $5
million for the environmental health laboratory, $7
million to strengthen state and local epidemiological
and surveillance capacity, $11 million for regional
laboratories for detecting and measuring biological
and chemical agents, $28 million to establish a
national health alert network, $20 million for polio
eradication activities, and $8 million for measles
eradication activities.





$12,172,000 for the Office of the Secretary, allocated as follows: $2.5 million for the Office of
Emergency Preparedness for a national disaster
medical system, $1.5 million for developing national
response capabilities, $3 million for metropolitan
medical response systems, $1.85 million for a
nuclear weapons radiation study, and $3 million in
for the renovation and modernization of Fort
McClellan’s Noble Army Hospital in Alabama for
bioterrorism training activities. The conference
agreement also included $322,000 to be provided to
Calhoun County, Michigan, for reimbursement of
certain expenses related to food-borne illnesses.
The remaining approximately $50 million is to be
used “to address the HIV/AIDS crisis facing the
African American community and other racial and
ethnic minority communities due to the changing
demographics of the disease.”

THE FORUM SESSION
The Forum has invited a number of experts to help sort
through how the health care community can better prepare
for and contribute to the prevention of a biological
terrorist attack. Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D., assistant
secretary for planning and evaluation within DHHS and
a past commissioner of health for the City of New York,
will set the stage by addressing the following: What are
we preparing for? How well prepared are we? And what
do we need to do in the short-term and the long-term? Dr.
Hamburg has a distinguished record of scientific accomplishments and outstanding public service. She has been
elected to membership in the Institute of Medicine, the
New York Academy of Medicine, and the Council on
Foreign Relations and is a fellow of the American Association of the Advancement of Science.

Following Dr. Hamburg’s remarks panelists representing several areas of expertise will participate in a roundtable discussion focusing on the following questions:









What are the medical and public health ramifications
of a bioterrorist event?
What are the most serious bioweapons facing the
public health community today?
How prepared or ill-prepared are various sectors of
the health community to respond to a successful
bioterrorist attack of any proportion?
What kind of practical steps could be taken to
reduce the risk? To minimize the consequences?
How much would such steps cost? How should they
be funded?
What are the research needs? Who should be conducting the research?
What are the commonalities and differences between
chemical and biological terrorism? What elements
need to be considered in preparedness planning and
resource allocation? Should biological and chemical
terrorism be linked or unlinked for planning purposes?

Scott R. Lillibridge, M.D., director of the CDC’s
bioterrorism preparedness and response activities, was
the lead public physician during the initial U.S. Public
Health Service response to the Oklahoma City bombing
and was team leader for the U.S. Medical Delegation to
Tokyo following the Sarin release in 1995.
Davi M. D’Agostino, assistant director of GAO’s
National Security and International Affairs Division,
has been leading GAO’s work on crosscutting
counterterrorism issues for the past three years. In 1995,
Ms. D’Agostino was selected to attend the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces. She received the GAO
Meritorious Service Award in 1997.
Robert F. Knouss, M.D., director of the DHHS
Office of Emergency Preparedness, also directed the
Public Health Service’s refugee health activities during
the Cuban-Haitian entrant and Southeast Asian refugee
crisis and served as deputy director of the Pan American Health Organization.
Peter Rosen, M.D., director of the emergency
medicine residency program at the University of California, San Diego and professor of clinical medicine
and surgery there, also served as chair of the IOM’s
January 1999 study, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian
Medical Response.
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Donald A. Henderson, M.D., M.P.H., director of the
Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, is
also the Johns Hopkins University Distinguished Service
Professor and has appointments in the Departments of
Epidemiology and International Health in the School of
Hygiene and Public Health. Dr. Henderson also served as
dean of the faculty of the Johns Hopkins School of Public
Health and directed the World Health Organization’s
global smallpox eradication campaign.
Jerome M. Hauer, director, New York City’s
Office of Emergency Management, served on the
faculty of the Northeastern University Paramedic
Program, joined the Biomedical Division of IBM as
clinical research coordinator, and served as a volunteer
firefighter and as a member of a HAZMAT team in
Connecticut. Mr. Hauer is a member of the New York
City Police Department’s Honor Legion.
Robert M. Blitzer, associate director of the Center for
Counterterrorism, Technology, and Analysis at Science
Applications International Corporation, recently retired
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where he served
as the chief of the bureau’s domestic terrorism section.

ENDNOTES
1. The GAO report, due this summer, will be classified. The
unclassified version will be available this fall.
2. Includes nerve agents such as Sarin, blister agents such as
mustard and Lewisite, and pulmonary agents such as pulmonary phosgene.
3. E. Wagner Stearn and Allen E. Stearn, The Effects of
Smallpox on the Destiny of the American Indian (Boston:
Bruce Humphries, 1945), 44-5.
4. G. W. Christopher et al., “Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 278 (August 6, 1997), no. 5: 412.
5. This money cannot be obligated until DHHS submits an
operating plan to both the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees.
6. The House bill provided for this activity at CDC as nonemergency funding while the Senate bill provided for this
activity at the Office of Emergency Preparedness. Additionally, the conference agreement “assumes that within the
overall increase provided for NIH, $10,000,000 will be
allocated for vaccine research and development activities in
support of the bioterrorism initiative.”

Table 1-1:

Relative Capabilities for Response to Civilian Chemical and Biological Incidents at Four Levels of Medical Care

Capability

Local Responders

Initial Treatment
Facilities

State

Federal

Chemical

Biological

Chemical

Biological

Chemical

Biological

Chemical

Biological

Receipt of pre-incident intelligence

L

L

L

L

S

S

S

S

Detection, identification, and quantification of agents in
the environment

S

L

L

L

S

S

H

S

Personal protective equipment

S

S

L

S

L

S

S

S

Safe and effective patient extraction

S

S

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

S

S

Methods for recognizing symptoms and signs in
patients

S

S

S

S

L

L

S

S

Detection and measurement of agent exposure in
clinical samples

L

L

L

S

L

S

H

H

N/A

N/A

S

S

S

S

S

S

Mass-casualty triage techniques and procedures

S

S

S

S

L

L

S

S

Methods/procedures for decontamination of exposed
individuals

S

S

L

L

L

L

S

S

Availability, safety, and efficacy of drugs and other
therapies

L

L

S

S

L

L

S

S

Prevention, assessment, and treatment of psychological
effects

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

Methods for recognizing covert exposure in populations

NOTE: H = highly capable; S = some capability; L = little or no capability; and N/A = not applicable.
Source: Institute of Medicine, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, January 1999), 20.

